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I. 
FROM ROETO CARHART 
Since 1973, Roe v.. Wade has served as shorthand in the United States 
for the proposition that women have a constitutionally protected right to 
abortion.1 Roe has also been used as a rallying cry for opponents of 
abortion rights who, in the words of Professors Reva Siegel and Robert 
Post, sparked" Roe rage" to mobilize a diverse set of interests into a social 
movement committed to the reversal of the decision.2 
In 2007, constitutional lawyers in the United States got a new 
shorthand- Carhart-the first decision since the 1973 ruling in Roe v.. 
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1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 
42 HARV. C.R.-c.L. L. REV. 373 (2007). The history of abortion litigation leading up to Roe 
is provided in BEFORE ROE V. WADE. VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING (Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter BEFORE ROE V. WADEj. 
226 
2011] PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 227 
Wade to uphold the facial validity of a statute that limits access to abortion 
without providing an express exception for risks to a woman's health, as 
contrasted to abortions "necessary to save the life of a mother."3 That 
statute, provocatively named by Congress the "Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act of 2003," subjects doctors who "knowingly" perform a particular kind 
of abortion (designed to reduce the risk of infection to women) to criminal 
sanctions including prison terms of up to two years.4 
One might be tempted to assign Carhart to a particularly contentious 
corner of law and morality in the United States and, absent an interest in 
reproductive rights, turn away. But Carhart offers a myriad of lessons 
about the role of courts in democracy, the evocative power of 
constitutional claims, the relevance of texts and precedents to 
constitutional judgments, the effects of national and transnational 
movements, and the autonomy of women, of health professionals, of 
Congress, and of judges-including those sitting on the Supreme Court. 
Further, in contrast to an oft-invoked presumption that judicial review 
displaces or silences democratic processes, the decisions in Roe and in 
Carhart demonstrate the dependency of democracies on dialogic 
interaction among the many groups within and across social orders. As this 
brief essay sketches, legal generativity from actors arrayed about the 
political spectrum is an artifact of adjudication in democratic polities. 
II. 
THE INSTABILITY OF CARHART 
To appreciate how Carhart engendered, rather than quieted, 
constitutional debate, elaboration of the arguments and conflicts within 
the decision is needed. At first glance, Carhart might be viewed as a minor 
ruling that does not mark a major retreat from Roe v. Wade. On its face, 
both the Act in question and the decision rendered have a limited reach. 
The procedure at issue is atypical: eighty-five to ninety percent of the 1.3 
million abortions recorded annually in the United States take place during 
the first three months of a pregnancy.s Further, the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Act does not preclude abortions, even when late-term and after viability. 
Rather, as Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court explained, the Act 
bans "only" one method by which abortions tak~ place: the deliberate and 
knowing delivery of a "living fetus" killed after the "fetal trunk past the 
navel is outside the body of the mother" or "in the case of a head-first 
presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother."6 The 
3. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); 18 U.S.c. § 1531 (2006). 
4. 18 U.S.c. § 153l. 
5. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 134 (citing Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 
F. Supp. 2d 957,960 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2004». 
6. Id. at 147-48 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 1531(b)(I)(A». 
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doctor's crime thus has "anatomical landmarks" related to the mother's 
body.7 As a consequence, the opinion held, the Act's definition of the 
crime was not unconstitutionally vague.s Moreover, the majority 
explained, were doctors to get past that critical point by "accident or 
inadvertence ,,,9 they ought not be prosecuted.to The decision thereby 
provided doctors with both a defense to prosecution and an option of 
seeking a court's declaration in advance that a specific abortion was 
necessary, given "a particular condition" related to a woman's health.l1 If 
doctors were willing to risk criminal sanctions by repeatedly testing the 
boundaries of the ruling, their claims could narrow its import. On the other 
hand, given the rarity of the procedure, few opportunities for litigating its 
import would be likely to arise. 
But the dissent, the concurrence, and the bulk of the Kennedy opinion 
tell another story, making plain the distance Carhart stands from Roe and 
from the judgments in between. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, moved to 
read excerpts of the dissent from the bench when Carhart was rendered in 
April of 2007, called it "alarming."I2 The brief concurrence by Justice 
Thomas Goined by Justice Scalia) spoke directly to the larger stakes.13 In 
the wake of the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the 
departure of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, some opponents of abortion 
had hoped that a new majority of five would adopt what the Thomas 
concurrence in Carhart proposed: that "the Court's abortion 
jurisprudence ... has no basis in the Constitution. ,,14 In the years since 
Carhart was decided, efforts to make that proposition law through limiting 
access to abortion have intensified, as state legislatures have enacted 
additional impediments to the procedure. IS 
7. Id at 148 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 46, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-
380/1382»; id. at 153. 
8. Id at 149. 
9. Id at 148. 
10 Id. at 150. 
11. fd at 167. 
12. Id. at 170 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also Linda Greenhouse, In Reversal of 
Course, Justices, 5-4, Back Ban on Abortion Method, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19,2007, at Al. 
13 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 168 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
14. Id at 169. 
15. For example, in 2009, North Dakota enacted a statute requiring that abortion 
providers inform women that they may receive an ultrasound and hear a fetal heartbeat 
before obtaining an abortion (the latter option is called "auscultation"). That state's only 
abortion provider, the Red River Women's Clinic in Fargo, filed suit and obtained a state 
court judgment clarifying that abortion providers were not required to provide auscultation 
services but were to inform women that such services might be available. See North Dakota 
Court Provides Clarity on Vague and Confusing Abortion Restriction, erR. FOR REPROD. 
RIGHTS· (Aug. 12, 2009), http://reproductiverights.orglenlpress-roomlnorth-dakota-court-
provides-clarity-on-vague-and-confusing-abortion-restriction. Several states require women 
to make two separate trips to health care providers before being able to obtain an abortion. 
See CrR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, 2010 LEGISLATIVE WRAP UP 5, 
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III. 
THE "FACfS": MEDICAL AND CONGRESSIONAL 
Carhart prompted both applause and distress because it is the first 
decision since Roe that "blesse[ d]" a prohibition of abortion that does not 
include provisions "safeguarding a woman's health.,,16 Moreover, the 
Court did so by ratifying what Congress had styled "factual findings," such 
as the claim that a consensus in medicine viewed this method of abortion 
as "inhumane" and "never medically necessary.,,17 The Court chose the 
congressional view of medical "fact" over the judgment of the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, which had provided evidence 
that, on occasion, such procedures were needed both to protect a woman's 
health and her future procreative possibilities. IS That professional view 
prompted one of the appellate courts (later overturned by the Supreme 
Court) to insist that the "Constitution requires legislatures to err on the 
side of protecting women's health by including a health exception ... 19 
The Supreme Court's deference to Congress on questions of "medical 
necessity" was particularly perplexing given that the record created in 
Congress before the Act'spassage was filled with other "findings" devoid 
(as the major~ty acknowledged) of accuracy.20 For example, Congress had 
"found" that no medical school in the United States taught doctors how to 
perform the procedure.21 But, in fact, several major teaching institutions 
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.netlft1es/documentsl 
state_wrapup_201O.pdf (last visited May 18, 2011); GU1TMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN 
BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION, (Mar. 1, 2011), 
http://www.guttmacher.orglstatecenterlspibs/spib_MWPA.pdf; A Year in Review: 2009 
Legislative Wrap Up, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, http://reproductiverights.orglenlfeature/ 
a-year-in-review-2009-legislative-wrap-up (last visited May 18, 2011). Plaintiffs obtained an 
injunction against portions of the Arizona legislation, but the two-trip requirement 
remained in effect. See Tucson Women's Center v. Arizona Medical Board, CTR. FOR 
REPROD. RIGHTS (Sept. 29, 2009), http://reproductiverights.orglenlcase/tucson-womens-
center-v-arizona-medical-board. See also infra note 44 (discussing recent restrictive 
legislation in Nebraska and Oklahoma). 
16. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
17. Id. at 141 (majority opinion) (quoting the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. 108-105 § 2(7), 117 Stat. 1201,1201 (2003) (codified at notes following 18 U.S.c. § 
1531 (2006»). 
18. See id. at 17{}-71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[The Court's opinion] tolerates, 
indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure found necessary and 
proper in certain cases by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists."); 
Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 10, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (Nos. 05-380/1382). 
19. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
20. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 165 ("Whether or not accurate at the time, some of the 
important findings have been superseded."). 
21. Id at 175 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 
2003, Pub. L. 108-105, § 2(14)(8), 117 Stat. at 1204). 
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did.22 Moreover, in other cases, members of the Court who were also in the 
Carhart majority had been energetic in overseeing congressional fact-
finding and concluded that what they viewed as impoverished 
congressional records demonstrated that certain issues were beyond 
congressional authority or that legislative remedies failed to be 
"proportionate" and "congruent" to the harms the record before Congress 
had identified.23 
In contrast to the one-sided investigation by Congress (a "polemic," as 
the dissent noted24), the trial courts spent weeks hearing from medical 
experts.25 Those evidentiary explorations were the predicates to lower 
court conclusions that, as a matter of fact, the intact dilation and 
evacuation procedure (referred to by the politically freighted but medically 
meaningless congressional term "partial-birth abortion") provided a safer 
means of abortion for women who suffered from various medical 
conditions (such as certain forms of heart disease) than did alternative 
procedures.26 Adding its own political freight, the Kennedy decision 
repeatedly chose to label surgeons, whose specialty is gynecology and 
obstetrics, "abortion doctors,,27 over the dissent's objection that such 
nomenclature was pejorative.28 
22. Id at 175-76. The list included "Columbia, Cornell, Yale, New York University, 
Northwestern, University of Pittsburgh, University of Pennsylvania, University of 
Rochester, and University of Chicago." Id (quoting Brief of the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 18, 
at 18). 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,614,625-26 (2000) (holding that 
Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to 
enact a federal civil remedy provision in the Violence Against Women Act of 1994); Kimel 
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked the 
authority to impose liability on states under the Age Discrimination Act of 1967); Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999) 
(overturning the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997) (holding that Congress lacked the power to enact 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993). 
24. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 175 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[T]he oral testimony before 
Congress was not only unbalanced, but intentionally polemic." (quoting Planned 
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957,1019 (N.D. Cal. 2004))). 
25. See id. at 177 ("[T]he District Courts made findings after full trials at which all 
parties had the opportunity to present their best evidence. The co.urts had the benefit of 
'much more extensive medical and scientific evidence ... concerning the safety and 
necessity of intact D&Es.''' (quoting Planned Parenthood, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1014»); id 
("[The] District Court 'heard more evidence during its trial than Congress heard over the 
span of eight years.''' (citing Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 482 
(S.D.N.Y.2004))). 
26. See id at 177-79 (noting the significant amount of expert testimony introduced 
during trial that contradicted Congress' claims that intact D&E was never medically 
necessary). 
27. Id at 138, 144, 154, 155, 161, 163 (majority opinion). 
28. Id. at 186-87 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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IV. 
"PROMOTING FETAL LIFE" BY "PROTECTING" WOMEN FROM MAKING 
DECISIONS 
Justice Ginsburg's dissent took on the Court's OpInIOn In another 
respect: its analysis of the government's "legitimate and substantial 
interest in preserving and promoting fetal life. ,,29 As the dissent explained, 
the Act does not preserve fetal life per se but instead precludes the ending 
of fetal life by a particular procedure?O What appeared to be animating 
Justice Kennedy's approach can be found in two facets of the majority's 
remarkable narration: its sense of abortion as unmitigated violence and its 
characterization of women as mothers in need of protection. 
The opinion begins by positioning all types of abortion as terrible acts 
of aggression.31 The narrative structure is reminiscent of the detailed 
descriptions of crimes that open many of the Court's rulings upholding 
convictions of criminal defendants. Much of the decision's specific and 
gruesome discussion of "dismemberment" is legally superfluous; some 
procedures detailed ("vacuum aspiration," the medicine RU-486 , and 
others)32 were not before the Court. Indeed, the majority's decision to 
uphold a ban on the extraction of an intact fetus intact left the method of 
abortion that it described as "dismemberment" legal.33 
But perhaps not for long. The decision acknowledged that the 
"standard" dilation and evacuation (D & E) procedure could be 
considered "in some respects as brutal, if not more," than the intact D & E 
method banned by the Act34 -thereby inviting legislators who were anti-
abortion to address these other "brutal" procedurcs as they assert their 
interest in protection of fetal life. Not mentioned in the majority opinion 
are the reasons (risk of infection, preservation of future childbearing 
capacity) why women and their physicians chose the intact D & E when 
facing the disaster of a pregnancy gone wrong because a fetus was terribly 
injured or deformed.35 
The second remarkable feature of the opinion is its characterization of 
pregnant women as mothers who, given "the bond of love the mother has 
29. Id. at 181 (quoting Carhart, 550 U.S. at 145). 
30. Id. at 181 ("The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a 
method of perfonning abortion.") (emphasis in the original). 
31 See id. at 134-40 (majority opinion). 
32. Id. at 134. 
33. Id. at 156 (distinguishing the abortions prohibited by the Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban Act from abortions in which doctors "intend dismemberment before delivery"); id. at 
182 (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting) ("Delivery of an intact, albeit nonviable, fetus warrants 
special condemnation, the Court maintains, because a fetus that is not dismembered 
resembles an infant. "). 
34. Id. at 160 (majority opinion). 
35. See id. at 177 (Ginsburg, 1., dissenting). 
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for her child," are inevitably in need of protection.36 The opinion relied on 
an amicus filing that argued that women suffer something called "post-
abortion syndrome," said to entail regret, shame, and loss of self-esteem.37 
Although acknowledging that "no reliable data to measure the 
phenomenon" existed,3S Justice Kennedy proffered a view of a pregnant 
woman that has become a signature of the decision. 
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of 
love the mother has for her child .... In a decision so fraught with 
emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose 
precise details of the means that will be used .... It is self-evident 
that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must 
struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound 
when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: 
that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-
developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human 
form.39 
V. 
PRISONERS OF THEIR SEX 
Missing in the majority's discussion is a comparable claim, made on 
behalf of fathers, that they too would feel anguish and loss when 
prospective parenthood is precluded. The focus, instead, was on women 
whom the majority described as "mothers," even when they had had 
abortions. This conflation of women with mothers prompted the dissenters 
to object that the majority did not recognize women as full and equal 
citizens, able to function as economic and social actors equal to men.40 As 
Justice Ginsburg's opinion detailed, the prior abortion jurisprudence had 
been founded on recognition of a woman's "personhood," "autonomy," 
and individual "dignity," which required that the decision to bear children 
was hers to make.41 While "ancient notions" of women had placed them 
36. See id. at 159-60 (majority opinion). 
37. Brief of Sandra Cano, the Former "Mary Doe" of Doe v. Bolton, and 180 Women 
Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22-24, Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124 (Nos. 05-380/1382),2006 WL 1436684, dted in Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. 
38. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159. 
39. Id. at 159-60. One commentator has argued that the imagery of trauma invoked by 
Justice Kennedy is shared by some feminist writings asserting bodily rights of freedom from 
coercion. See Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion 
Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 1193 (2010). 
40. Id. at 183-86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's invocation of the "bond 
of love the mother has for her child" to justify its holding). 
41. Id at 170-71 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851-
52 (1992». 
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inevitably as mothers who had to be protected by men,42 contemporary 
laws and constitutional commitments saw women as actors owning their 
own "destiny.,,43 
Given the majority's view that doctors might be reluctant to provide 
all relevant information and that women would not press for details, one 
would have expected a different denouement-rejecting the ban on 
"partial-birth abortions" but inviting regulations that required the 
disclosure of risks and benefits as a predicate to legally sufficient consent. 
That template can be found in various legislative provisions directing 
health care providers to give pregnant women certain specific information. 
Doctors have objected that those directions violate their medical ethics 
and freedom of speech as well as women's privacy and liberty, and some 
courts have agreed.44 But rather than promote regulation of decision-
making, Carhart upheld a ban precluding women,men, and doctors of 
either sex from coming to their own judgments about how to proceed. 
Carhart is thus momentous in that it marks the emergence in 
constitutional doctrine of what Reva Siegel has called a "woman-
42. Id. at 171. 
43. Id. at 185. 
44. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 
(D. Neb. 2010). In that decision, the federal court restrained Nebraska state defendants 
from enforcing a law, enacted on April 13, 2010, that would have required medical 
providers to inform women of any risk factors "including any physical, psychological, 
emotional, demographic, or situational factor, for which there is a statistical association 
with one or more complications associated with abortion such that there is less than a five 
percent probability (P < .05) that such statistical association is due to chance." Id. at 1032. 
The court concluded that the plaintiffs, Planned Parenthood of the Heartland and an 
obstetrician, were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that the statute violated 
their liberty and privacy interests under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and their First Amendment rights. fd. at 1046, 1048. On August 18, 2010, the 
Nebraska Attorney General agreed to a settlement with Planned Parenthood and the 
American Civil Liberties Union that stipulated to a permanent injunction. Order and Final 
Judgment, Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb. 2010) (No. 4:10-CV-03122), ECF No. 
64. 
In the spring of 2010, Oklahoma enacted a provision, H.B. 2780, that requires medical 
providers to display to women live ultrasound images, to provide a "simultaneous 
explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting," and to "[p]rovide a medical description of 
the ultrasound images, which shall include the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the 
presence of cardiac activity, if present and viewable, and the presence of external members 
and internal organs, if present and viewable." Petition, Nova Health Sys. v. Edmondson, 
No. CV-2010-533 (Okla. D. Ct., Apr. 27, 2010), available at 
http://reproductiverights.org!sites/crr.civicactions.netlfiles/ documentslPetition.pdf. On July 
19, 2010, a state court issued a temporary injunction of the law. See Barbara Hoberock, 
Judge Extends Order Blocking Oklahoma Abortion Law, TuLSA WORLD, July 19, 2010, 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid= 17 &articleid=20100719 _17_0_ OKL 
AH0486872. See also GUlTMACHER INST. STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR 
ULTRASOUND 1 (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.guttmacher.orgtstatecenterlspibs/spib_RFU.pdf 
(summarizing various states' ultrasound requirements); Khiara M. Bridges, Capturing the 
Judiciary: Carhart and the Undue Burden Standard, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915, 970 
(2010) (noting that "Oklahoma's mandatory ultrasound law is one of the most severe"). 
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protective" rationale.45 This approach has been promoted-as documented 
in a volume by Reva Siegel and Linda Greenhouse-by a significant and 
sustained social movement that pushed the debate about abortion to the 
forefront.46 Those efforts changed the agenda of the Republican Party, 
which once had neither focused on abortion nor made anti-abortion efforts 
a part of its platform.47 In the last decades in which women's rights have 
come to be accepted, abortion objectors have adopted the language of 
women's rights to frame arguments that anti-abortion statutes are 
themselves pro-women by protecting women from what would otherwise 
be ill-informed judgments to abort rather than enjoying the fulfillment of 
motherhood.48 
Yet, as the excerpt from Justice Kennedy's majority opinion suggests, 
another way to describe the decision in Carhart is that it treats women as 
prisoners of their sex by confining women to a maternal role presumed to 
render them incompetent decision-makers. Prisoners are another category 
of adults treated, because of a different form of confinement, as unable to 
give consent for certain medical procedures. Law limits their agency on the 
theory that their condition, incarceration, renders them subject to 
misjudgments.49 The rationale proffered by the Kennedy opinion is that 
women are also a category of persons to be told by law that they can have 
45. See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of 
Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 993 (2007) [hereinafter 
Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion]. See also Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of 
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey"carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008) 
[hereinafter Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection]. 
46. See BEFORE ROE V. WADE, supra note 2. 
47. Idat 113, 157,215-16. 
48. See generally Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 45; Siegel, Dignity 
and the Politics of Protection, supra note 45. 
49. See, e.g., 28 c.F.R. §§ 512.10-21 (2009) (U.S. Bureau of Prisons regulations setting 
forth "additional requirements ... to obtain approval to conduct research within the 
Bureau of Prisons ... and responsibilities of Bureau staff in processing proposals and 
monitoring research projects," beyond the "[g]eneral provisions for the protection of 
human subjects"); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.207, 46.301-.306, 46.401-.408 (2009) (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services regulations establishing additional 
requirements governing federally-administered research involving pregnant women, 
fetuses, neonates, prisoners, and children). See also Bruce J. Winick, Coercion and Mental 
Health Treatment, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1145, 1150 (1997) (discussing the Department of 
Health and Human Services regulations, as well as debates among participants of the 
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research over "whether prisoners can give truly voluntary consent to participate in 
research"). As Maya Manian has detailed, other areas in which the state, rather than 
individuals and doctors, makes decisions about individuals' health include bans on 
controlled substances and regulation of experimental drugs, as well as mandatory 
vaccination programs and prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide. See Maya Manian, 
The Irrational Woman: Infonned Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL'y 223 (2009). She distinguished those procedures as not precluding 
"medical treatment proven to be physically safer based on the government's unproven 
view" of the psychological harms imposed. Id. at 264-65. See also id at 265-89. 
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no volition because their condition, pregnancy, makes them incompetent 
to act on their own behalf. The majority opinion goes further-in the face 
of maternal grief, it insists, doctors too will be unnerved: "In a decision so 
fraught with emotional consequence, some doctors may prefer not to 
disclose precise details of the means that will be used .... ,,50 Law thus 
divests both doctors and women of their autonomy. 
In this respect, Carhartis a judicial foray into psychology coupled with 
religious overtones about the meaning of life. The majority opinion is an 
amalgam of presumptions about the emotions and motivations of mothers 
and of doctors (fathers remain missing in action), interspersed with moral 
or religious views about when life begins and what a pregnancy means for 
a woman.51 Pervading the majority opinion is its own sense of what is self-
evident and uncontestable about human nature and life; that approach, in 
turn, opens up yet other questions. If women are at risk of making the 
wrong decisions and if the government has a legitimate interest in fetal life, 
can the state prevent women from eating certain foods or from drinking 
alcohol while pregnant? What about affirmative (as well as negative) 
obligations, such as requiring that women submit to fetal monitoring, 
ultrasounds, or Caesarian sections under certain circumstances? Could 
legislation oblige women to consume foods and vitamins that promote 
fetal growth? 52 
Such questions may sound dramatic or fanciful, but they have real-
world analogues. Women have been criminally prosecuted in some 
jurisdictions for failure to protect a fetus. 53 In 2003, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court upheld the conviction and the twenty-year sentence of a 
mentally limited, cocaine-addicted woman who had been charged with 
murder when her child was stillborn.54 In other states, women accused of 
substance abuse have been subject to civil confinement,55 and guardians 
50. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007). 
51. See generalIy Bridges, supra note 44. 
52. See Margo Kaplan, "A Special Class of Persons':' Pregnant Women~ Right to 
Refuse Medical Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 145 (2010). 
53. See generalIy Linda C. Fentiman, In the Name of Fetal Protection: Why American 
Prosecutors Pursue Pregnant Drug Users (And Other Countries Don't), 18 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 647 (2009); Linda C. Fentiman, The New "Fetal Protection':' The Wrong 
Answer to the Cnsis of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. 
REv. 537 (2006) [hereinafter Fentiman, The New "Fetal Protection ']. 
54. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171, 179 (S.c. 2003). After McKnight had been 
imprisoned for seven years, the South Carolina Supreme Court overturned her conviction 
on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354, 357-59, 
366 (2008). 
55. April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant 
Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147, 164-72 (2007) 
(citing state statutes authorizing civil confmement and examples of prosecutions); 
Fentiman, The New "Fetal Protection," supra note 53, at 545-46, 566-68 (citing state 
statutes authorizing civil confinement and examples of prosecutions). 
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have been appointed for fetuses. 56 
Further, the idea of the fetus as an independent person in-being has 
been nurtured under some state laws as well as by provisions of federal 
law. Since 2002, federal regulations promulgated by the Department of 
Health and Human Services have defined "children" eligible for jointly 
funded state and federal health insurance plans to include individuals 
"under the age of 19 including the period from conception to birth.,,57 The 
"Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004" makes it a federal crime to 
injure or cause death to a fctus if committing another federal offense; the 
Act defines "unborn child" as "a member of the species homo sapiens, at 
any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.,,58 While current 
proposals do not aim to prevent men from endangering their sperm, voters 
in Colorado have been asked repeatedly to enact a constitutional 
amendment to provide that "inalienable rights, equality of justice and due 
process of law" apply to "every human being from the beginning of the 
biological development of that human being." Thus far, these proposals 
have not been enacted,59 even as similar ballot provisions are in the offing 
in other jurisdictions.60 
56. Cherry, supra note 55, at 161, 168 n.92 (citing cases); Fentiman, The New "Fetal 
Protection," supra note 53, at 570-72 (citing cases). 
57. 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (2009). 
58. 18 U.S.c. § 1841(d) (2006). 
59. Lynn Bartels, "Personhood" Proposal's 2010 Ballot Title Approved, DENVER 
POST, Aug. 6, 2009, at B3; Joseph Boven, Personhood's Jones Says Amendment's Effects 
Exaggerated But Real, COLO. INDEP., July 15, 2010, 
http://coloradoindependen t.coml573211personhoods-jones-says-amendments-effects-
exaggerated-but-real. In November 2010, Colorado voters rejected the amendment by a 3-1 
margin. Electa Draper, The Colorado Vote: Amendment 62: "Personhood" Initiative Sinks 
by 3-1 Margin, DENVER POST, Nov. 3, 2010, at B2. In November 2008, Colorado voters 
rejected a similar amendment, which would have redefined "person" to include "any 
human being from the moment of fertilization," with 72.8% of ballots cast against the 
measure. Tim Hoover, Voter Rematch on Personhood, DENVER POST, July 3, 2009, at Bl. 
60. For example, in November, 2011, Mississippi voters may be asked to vote on a 
similar constitutional amendment that would define person to include "every human being 
from the moment of fertilization, cloning or the functional equivalent thereof." Laura 
Bauer, Anti-Abortion Activists Seek To Redefine "Person," CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE 
PRESS, Apr. 7, 2010, at A12. On July 6,2010, plaintiffs filed suit in Mississippi state court to 
block the amendment from appearing on the ballot; they argued that the initiative process 
cannot be used to change the state Bill of Rights. Suit Seeks To Block Miss. "Personhood" 
Initiative, PICAYUNE ITEM, July 14, 2010, http://picayuneitem.comlstatenews/x961152867/ 
Suit-seeks-to-block-Miss-personhood-initiative. A Hinds County judge ruled that the 
initiative could appear on the ballot, a ruling that is expected to be appealed to the state 
supreme court. Elizabeth Crisp, Judge OKs Mississippi Anti-Abortion Initiative for '11 
BaJJots, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Oct. 27, 2010. On January 8, 2010, a Nevada 
state court ruled that a "personhood" petition contained language so vague that it could not 
be circulated among voters; the proposed petition also violated a state law limiting ballot 
questions to one subject. Ed Vogel, Petition Ruled Too Vague for '10 Ballot, LAS VEGAS 
REv.-J., Jan. 9, 2010, at Bl. Other states considering such initiatives include Missouri and 
Alaska. See Bauer, supra. 
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VI. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PREDICATES 
The proposition that a fetus is a human being with constitutional rights 
points to another aspect of Carhart to be analyzed before I turn to its 
future in light of social movements, both domestic and international. What 
was the constitutional basis that gave Congress the power to ban an 
abortion method? Congress cited its power over interstate commerce and 
defined the scope of the statute as addressing physicians "in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce.,,61 The parties did not challenge that 
claim.62 
The Commerce Clause has been used before as a basis for regulating 
morality. One example is the Mann Act, a turn-of-the-twentieth century 
statute (named for its sponsor) that prohibited the interstate transport of 
women for sexual purposes.63 Nonetheless, in relatively recent decisions, 
the Court has read the scope of the Commerce Clause more narrowly. For 
example, a 2000 decision by then Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 
five-person majority, held that Congress lacked the power under both the 
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize victims of 
violence "motivated by gender bias" to bring civil damage actions in 
federal court under the Violence Against Women Act (V A WA).64 In a 
1995 case, the Court held that Congress could not rely on the Commerce 
Clause to prohibit guns within a thousand feet of schools.65 On the other 
hand, the Court has relied on the Commerce Clause to uphold 
congressional regulation of marijuana used for medical purposes,66 and the 
debate about the constitutionality of federal health care legislation also 
turns on the scope of the Commerce Clause and its relevance to social 
welfare and community wellbeing.67 
61. 18 U.S.c. § 1531(a) (2006). 
62. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
63. Pub. L. No. 61-277, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (current version codified at 18 U.S.c. §§ 
2421-2424 (2006»). 
64. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000). See generally Judith Resnik, 
Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001). 
65. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
66. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
67. As of this writing, four federal district courts have issued decisions on the merits of 
constitutional challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L. No. 
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Two of those courts had upheld the statute as within 
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:1O-cv-
00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299, at *11 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-
2347 (4th Cir. Dec. 1,2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 891-95 
(E.D. Mich. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2010). Two other courts 
held that the statute exceeded the bounds of the Commerce Clause. Florida ex reI. Bondi v. 
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RVIEMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *20-
29 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Virginia ex reI. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775-
82 (E.D. Va. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 11-1057 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 2011). 
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While the ban at issue in Carhart was keyed to doctors working in 
interstate commerce, the justification invoked to uphold it-namely, the 
government's interest in protecting fetallife68-is less obviously related to 
interstate commerce. That point was implicitly raised by Justice Thomas's 
concurrence, which noted the failure of either party to brief or raise the 
question of the Act's constitutionality as an exercise of Congress' 
Commerce Clause powers; on that ground, he declined to address the 
question.69 Thomas, a persistent advocate of a narrow reading of the 
Commerce Clause, has argued that it provides only the basis for Congress 
to regulate the purchase and sale of goods and services.70 Under his 
approach, congressional authority for abortion bans could be based on the 
service prong (if provisions of abortions are understood to entail interstate 
activities) but may also prompt a search for other constitutional predicates. 
What would be the source of authority for congressional action if not 
or if in addition to the Commerce Clause? If one takes the position that 
the national legislature has no general welfare powers and only limited 
Commerce Clause authority, where can one look for congressional power 
to promote or protect fetal development? Would one have to argue that a 
fetus is a "person" or other form of life protected by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibitions against governmental deprivation of 
"life, liberty, or property without due process of law"?71 Would the 
argument be that, in addition to ensuring procedural fairness, the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments should be 
enlisted to impose substantive limits on state power?72 Can those 
68. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007). 
69. See id. at 169 (Thomas, J., concurring). In contrast, a recent analysis of the 
Commerce Clause detailed the Clause's concern with exchange across state lines, as it 
analyzed why "commerce-as-intercourse" is broader than "economics narrowly conceived" 
and supports federal regulatory interventions affecting labor, discrimination, and health. 
SeegeneraJJyJack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
70. See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 58 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Commerce Clause 
empowers Congress to regulate the buying and selling of goods and services trafficked 
across state lines."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 586-89 (Thomas, J., concurring) (contrasting 
"commerce" with "manufacturing" and "agriculture"). See also Balkin, supra note 69, at 
18-23 (discussing the "trade theory" view of Justice Thomas and others that under the 
Commerce Clause, "commerce" is limited to the "trade or exchange of commodities"). The 
argument that harms to health burdened interstate commerce was also put forth by 
proponents of the constitutionality of the civil rights remedy in V A W A and rejected by the 
five-person majority in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See supra note 64 
and accompanying text. 
71. U.S. CaNST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. 
n. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) ("Roe recognized the right 
of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and confirmed 
once more that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive 
dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person."); Foucha v. 
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("[T]he Due Process Clause contains a substantive 
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the 
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prohibitions on government become a springboard for positive obligations 
to protect fetal life? Such are the questions of the sources, nature, and 
proper exercises of government power over fertile or pregnant women-
and men - that now hang in Carharfs wake. 
VII. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW SUBJECI' TO REVISION 
Carhart is part of a series of efforts to undermine Roe's meaning and 
import. What the span from Roe to Carhart makes plain is that even 
decisions couched in terms of constitutional absolutes are part of an 
iterative process in democracies. If significant constituencies disagree 
about the underlying premises and if they are able to marshal the 
resources and use media and politics persistently, their actions can result in 
the revision of constitutional pillars. 
Whether a fan of Roe, of Carhart, or of neither, reading the two 
opinions together undermines a central claim made by critics of judicial 
review. These critics posit that when ruling on the constitutionality of 
legislation, judges undercut the role of elected leaders in a democracy by 
ending debate and aborting majoritarian decision-making.73 But judicial 
proclamations of constitutional parameters do not necessarily last, nor do 
they inevitably put an end to the debate. Roe remains the law, but its 
import and parameters have changed, and both Roe and Carhart are now 
subject to contestation and reevaluation. 
This phenomenon can be found in many areas of constitutional 
jurisprudence. Another illustration comes from three centuries of cont1ict 
over slavery and its residue. One can chart a path from the 1856 Supreme 
Court ruling in Dred Scott v. Sandford that a slave who had escaped to a 
free state had to be returned as a fugitive,14 to its rejection through the 
Civil War. The consequences of that struggle included amendments to the 
fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'" (quoting Zinennon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 
113, 125 (1990))); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,502 (1977) ("'[T]he full scope of 
the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the 
precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 
'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property .... 
It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial 
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.'" (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("In my view the proper constitutional inquiry in this case is 
whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the enactment violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.'" (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937»)). 
73 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAROFPOUTICS (1962); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). 
74. 60 U.S. 393 (~857). 
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U.S. Constitution to end involuntary servitude7S and to create rights of due 
process and of equal protection.76 
Another tragic decision, the 1896 ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson, upheld 
segregated seating for passengers on railroad cars.77 That judgment 
prompted decades of efforts by groups dedicated to equality. Successes 
came in various venues, including the 1948 executive order by President 
Harry Truman that ended segregation in the military.78 By the end of the 
1940s, the United States had joined the United Nations and signed onto 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a state court had read the 
obligations of the U.N. Charter to prohibit race-based limits on property 
ownership.79 
The Supreme Court's 1954 judgment in Brown v. Board of EducatiOI/o 
did not rely on transnational rights but instead reinterpreted the federal 
Constitution to prohibit certain forms of discrimination. In the 1960s, 
Congress, working with the Executive, passed critical civil rights 
legislation,81 and lower courts implemented the mandate of Brown.fO. These 
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
77. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
78. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 28, 1948). 
79. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) ("[W]e have recently 
pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to 'promote ... universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion.' How can this nation be faithful to this international 
pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race 
are permitted to be enforced?") (Black, J., concurring); Namba v. McCourt, 204 P.2d 569, 
577 (Or. 1949) ("Moreover this nation has recently pledged itself, through the United 
Nations Charter, to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion. The Alien Land 
Law stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of that national pledge. Its inconsistency with the 
Charter, which has been duly ratified by the United States is but one more reason why the 
statute must be condemned." (quoting Oyama, 332 U.S. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring»). 
See also Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952) (concluding that the U.N. Charter was 
"entitled to respectful consideration" as a "moral commitment of foremost importance" by 
courts and legislators, but holding that those Charter provisions were not self-executing and 
so did not supersede state law, and affirming the lower appellate court's invalidation of 
California's Alien Land Law on the alternate ground that the statute violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment). See generally Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations 
Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 923 
(1984) (noting that Namba "used the Charter human rights provisions to inform the 
meaning of the equal protection clause," but "was lost in the wake of the Sei Fujii cases"). 
80. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
81. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
3601); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.c. §§ 1971, 1973); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000). 
82. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 
1967) (en bane); Price v. Denison Indep. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 
1965). 
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developments demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amendment, once read to 
tolerate segregation, could be reread to mean that the government could 
not mandate either de jure or de facto separation by race and had 
obligations to alleviate the harms of its past policies. Yet even the pillar of 
Brown proved vulnerable as opposition mounted to its implementation 
through school busing and affirmative action.83 In response to long 
histories of segregation, local school boards in Louisville, Kentucky and 
Seattle, Washington each crafted voluntary efforts to promote racial 
diversity in their schools. But in 2007, the same five justices who came 
together in Carhart ruled in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1 that these local efforts impermissibly took 
race into account.84 
In short, although decisions serve as precedent and have the authority 
as stare decisis, no absolute barrier exists to reconsideration, especially 
(but not only) over decades. To the extent critics of judicial review object 
on the grounds that a constitutional judgment is preclusive of politics,85 
these examples demonstrate that revisions can and do occur. Although the 
United States, unlike Canada,86 has no formal provision in its Constitution 
for a "legislative override" that authorizes a legislature to enact statutes 
altering certain constitutional rulings, limits on judicial review exist in 
practice. 
In fact, Roe/Carhart, Plessy/Brown, and Brown/Seattle School District 
teach that constitutional rulings may inspire, rather than derail, political 
engagement. While some constitutional rulings rest easy, seeming both 
inevitable and inviolate, others serve as rallying cries; used by social 
movements both domestic and transnational. Given the high visibility of 
decisions made by the Supreme Court, they can readily become shorthand 
for committed activists to use. Within the legal academy, Professors Reva 
Siegel and Robert Post have named this pattern "democratic 
constitutionalism" to capture their point that "the authority of the 
Constitution depends on its democratic legitimacy," and that legitimacy in 
83. See generally GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING 
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996); 
David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 YALE 
L.J. 591, 645-56 (2004) (book review); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and 
Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts' Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 
(2003). 
84. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
85. See supra note 73. 
86. The Canadian legislative override provision, or "notwithstanding clause," allows 
both the Federal Parliament and provincial legislatures to declare that certain laws "shall 
operate notwithstanding a provision included in" key sections of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, e.l1, § 33 (U.K.). See also Nicholas 
Stephanopoulos, The Case for the Legislative Override, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN 
AFF. 250, 254-55 (2005). 
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turn is evidenced by popular engagement, making claims on behalf of or 
contestip.g the meaning of particular provisions.87 
VIII. 
NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
The conflict over abortion and its relationship to women's autonomy, 
citizenship, and to courts in democratic orders is by no means limited to 
the United States. As legislatures, courts, and transnational institutions 
debate these issues around the world, the outcomes are varied, with lines 
drawn and distinctions made on the basis of the timing or reason for 
abortions, the nature of the sanction imposed on doctors or women, and 
the availability of services for abortion. For example, while a series of 
decisions by the German Constitutional Court have upheld the 
criminalization of abortion, they have also detailed a process by which 
women, after counseling, have access to abortion as part of the state's 
affirmative obligations under its constitution to protect life.88 
In contrast, in 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada held illegal a 
criminal prohibition on abortion that had permitted the procedure in cases 
where the woman's health or life was at risk when approved by a medical 
panel of hospital doctors.89 That Court held that the statute violated 
Section 7 of Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protects the 
"right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.,,90 A majority found the statute unconstitutional, for various 
reasons.91 Four of the majority's five focused on the principle that "security 
of the person" included access to medical care for life or health "without 
fear of criminal sanction.,,92 Two emphasized the burdens of delays by 
87. Post & Siegel, supra note 2, at 374. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF 
THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED 
THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
88. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 
1975, 39 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1 (Ger.) and 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 88 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE]· 203 (Ger.), as 
reprinted in VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TuSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
110-29 (2d ed. 2006). See also VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT .IN A 
TRANSNATIONAL ERA 210-22 (2010); Mary Anne Case, Perfectionism and Fundamentalism 
in the Application of the German Abortion Laws, in CONSTITUTING EQUALITY: GENDER 
EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93 (Susan H. Williams ed., 2009); 
Gerald L. Neuman, Casey in the Mirror: Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in 
the United States and Germany, 43 AM. J. COMPo L. 273 (1995). 
89. See R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.c.R. 30 (Can.). 
90. Id at 45 (Dickson, c.J.). 
91. See, e.g., Jane Bailey, Towards an Equality-Enhancing Conception of Privacy, 31 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 267,285 n.46 (2008). 
92. Morgentaler, [1988J 1 S.c.R. at 81 (Beetz, J., joined by Estey, J.). See also id at 56 
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doctors and hospitals in responding to requests; the process infringed on 
fundamental rights by impermissibly imposing physical and psychological 
trauma on women seeking abortions.93 The opinion of the Chief Justice, 
. joined by another, insisted that law could not force "women to carry a 
foetus to term contrary to their own priorities and aspirations. ,,94 Another 
justice in the majority read the provision as unduly impinging on women's 
autonomy to make their own life choices and their freedom of religion.95 
Within the last few years, several other countries have addressed the 
question of abortion. In 2006, the Constitutional Court of Colombia held 
that an abortion could not be a criminal act if a woman's life or physical or 
mental health was at stake, if fetal malformations made unviable life, or if 
the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.96 Underlying the judgment 
were commitments to women's health, welfare, equality, dignity, liberty, 
and reproductive autonomy. In contrast, during the same year, the 
legislature in Nicaragua voted fifty-two to zero to criminalize all abortions, 
thereby superseding a law that had permitted abortions for rape, incest, or 
risks to a woman's life or health.97 
One relevant transnational instrument, now supported by more than 
185 nations, is the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W).98 While committing states 
parties to the equal treatment of women and men in health, employment, 
politics, and other facets of public and private life,99 CEDA W's silence on 
abortion rights reflects the contentiousness of the issue. Yet CEDAW's 
guarantee in Article 12 of women's right to health and wellbeing specifies 
rights of access to medical services including faIPJly planning. tOO The 
(Dickson, C.J., joined by Lamer, J.). 
93. Id. at 81 (Beetz, J., joined by Estey, J.). 
94. Id at 63 (Dickson, C.J., joined by Lamer, J.). 
95. Id. at 170-73,179-80 (Wilson, J.). 
96. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia C-
355/06 (Colom.). See Ver6nica Undurraga & Rebecca J. Cook, Constitutional 
Incorporation of International and Comparative Human Rights Law: The Colombian 
Constitutional Court Decision C-355/2006, in CONSTITlITING EQUALITY: GENDER 
EQUALITY AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITlITIONAL LAW 215 (Susan H. Williams ed., 2009). 
See also Rebecca Cook & Bernard M. Dickens, From Reproductive Choice to 
Reproductive Justice, 106 INT'LJ. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 106 (2009). 
97. Ley No. 603, 26 October 2006, Ley de Derogaci6n al Articulo 165 del C6digo 
Penal Vigente [Act Waiving Article 165 of the Penal Code In ForcelLA GACETA, DIARIO 
OFICIAL [L.G.], 17 November 2006 (Nicar.). 
98. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. AlRES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 
1981) [hereinafter CEDA W]. A list of countries that support the CEDA W is available at 
http://treaties.un.orglPagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREA TY &mtds~no=IV· 
8&chapter=4&lang=en. 
99. See CEDAW, supra note 98, at arts. 7-16. 
100. CEDA W, supra note 98, at art. 12(1) ("States Parties shall take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health care in order to 
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Committee that oversees CEnA W's implementation explained in its 
General Recommendation 24 ("Women and Health") that, to fulfill their 
obligations under Article 12, states parties must provide for women's 
safety and protect against the risk of stigma from unwanted pregnancies. lOl 
In terms of transnational rulings, in 2007 the European Court of 
Human Rights held that the requirement under Article 8 of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms that individual privacy rights not be subjected to unnecessary 
"interference by a public authority"l02 was violated when Poland failed to 
provide an abortion for a woman who had severe myopia, had two 
children, and was told that her eyesight was put at risk from a pregnancy.103 
In November 2007, in Llantoy Huaman v. Peru, the U.N. Human Rights 
Committee concluded that denying access to abortion for a seventeen-
year-old carrying a fetus with severe brain anencephaly violated her basic 
human rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 104 There, the Committee focused on requirements that persons be 
free "from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment," as well as protection 
for privacy and the need to pay special attention to minors' rights. lOS And, 
in a 1998 report that relied on CEDAW, the Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Women of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recognized 
the need for health services to ensure that women's lives are not 
threatened through unsafe abortions,l06 
Questions of access to abortion are thus being posed worldwide. Given 
that both proponents and opponents are part of transnational networks 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, access to health care services, including 
those related to family planning."). 
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ranging from religious orders to nongovernmental organizations, their 
efforts do not stop at a particular nation's border. Legal principles migrate, 
and judiciaries are one of the many mechanisms for the import and export 
of law.107 By considering the analytic bases of the judgments from these 
various jurisdictions, one can see the discussion around abortion move 
beyond the frameworks of privacy, liberty, and equality, which are the 
frequently proffered premises for supporting women's abortion rights in 
the United States. The issue of reproduction is located in broad sets of 
questions related to women's health and work, as the problem is addressed 
in terms of "human rights" to health and safety; to nondiscrimination on 
the basis of race, age, and gender; to economic opportunity; to freedom of 
speech, conscience, and religion; to autonomy and dignity.108 
IX. 
COURTS AS CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRACIES 
In sum, the adjudication of rights to reproductive health is part of a 
worldwide debate about the nature of citizenship, the obligations of 
parenthood, and the role of government in structuring individuals' lives. A 
central lesson, for those interested in the relationship between courts and 
democracies, from this overview is that rather than presuming courts to be 
a problem for democracy, courts are resources in that they facilitate 
democratic practices. 
Long before the creation of modern democracies, rulers relied on 
adjudication to enforce their laws and maintain security. In those pre-
democratic eras can be found proto-democratic practices inside courts. 
Even when working for monarchs, judges were required to "hear the other 
side" so as not to impose arbitrary decisions. Further, judges worked in 
public, demonstrating that the rulers had the power to enforce legal 
obligations.109 Commitments to democracy have transformed the "rites" of 
adjUdication by turning them into "rights" of access to open and public 
courts in which disputants are supposed to be treated with equal respect. I1O 
As women gained juridical voice, courts have had to consider how to 
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recognize and honor their citizenship, autonomy, and liberty.111 Because of 
these commitments to participatory parity and transparency, courts are 
regular contributors to the public sphere, and they serve as one of several 
venues for debating and developing norms.112 
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under scrutiny, to be reaffirmed or modified in light of social, political, and 
technological changes. The distinctive methods of courts, required to hear 
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judgments, make them particularly useful contributors to these 
deliberative processes. Adjudication in democracies is thus in an ongoing 
conversation with majoritarianism. 
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